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The paper examines flows of foreign direct 
investment within the Baltic region. The author 
demonstrates close investment ties among the 
EU members, which are of special importance 
for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Trans-
border corporate integration in the region is 
characterized by significant imbalances. In 
many aspects, it can be viewed as Sweden’s 
economic expansion or development of domes-
tic markets for northern European companies. 
Although many German, Polish and Russian 
companies are involved in corporate integra-
tion in the Baltic region, other vectors of their 
foreign economic relations are still more im-
portant for them. As a result, the integration of 
Russian business in the Baltic part of the 
European integration area is still rather weak 
despite Russia’s considerable foreign direct 
investment in the Baltic States. 
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Nowadays, almost the entire Baltic 
region is involved in the European inte-
gration process. Only Russia’s territories 
remain an exception. However, this re-
gion did not form the original core of 
European integration: Denmark joined 
the European Communities only in 1973; 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
had a restricted access to the Baltic Sea, 
expanded its territory in the result of the 
1990 German reunification; Sweden and 
Finland became members of the Euro-
pean Union in 1995; Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia joined the EU in 2004. 
In this respect, it is of special interest to 
observe how the top-down formal inte-
gration in the EU is backed up by the bot-
tom-up integration in the Baltic region, 
with corporate integration being a vivid 
example. Global experience shows that 
foreign direct investments of Trans-Na-
tional Corporations (TNC) can create a 
basis for long-term stability of formal in-
tegration projects. 
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Within the EU, corporate integration takes rather complicated forms. 
Along with interlaced capital at the level of an entire integration group (usu-
ally in large-scale corporate business), a number of sub-regional areas are also 
segregated. These areas are characterized by a significant role of direct in-
vestments of medium-sized business, often in the framework of cross-border 
cooperation [6, p. 31—35]. In this connection, we shall focus on investment 
activities of northern European companies, which are stimulated first and 
foremost by the traditional cooperation of the Nordic countries and, to a lesser 
degree, the establishment of the EU common economic space. The next point 
will be the investment activities of German and Polish TNCs in the Baltic re-
gion. We aim to examine the extent to which the accession of the Baltic region 
countries to the EU contributed to the development of northern European inte-
gration into European integration. The third part of the paper will define a po-
sition of Russian business in regional corporate integration and estimate the 
prospects of economic cooperation between Russia and the EU. 
 
Reasons for the domination of northern European investors 
 
According to statistics of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, large direct investment exporters in the Baltic region include not 
only Germany (by the end of 2010 the accumulated volume of German invest-
ments had reached 1,421 billion dollars; it ranked fourth in the world) but north-
ern European countries as well. It is Sweden that stands out (336 billion dollars; 
it ranked 16th in the world), although considerable foreign direct investments are 
also typical of Denmark (195 billion) and Finland (131 billion). Poland (37 bil-
lion) is worthwhile noting among the new members of the EU as it occupies a 
dominant position in central and Eastern Europe. By the end of 2010, Estonia, a 
small country, had made direct foreign investments of six billion dollars, 
whereas Lithuania’s foreign direct investments had equalled to two billion dol-
lars and Latvia’s foreign direct investments had accounted for less than one bil-
lion [13, p. 191]. It is obvious that the largest part of these countries’ invest-
ments, particularly made by large and medium-sized companies, goes out of the 
Baltic region. At the same time, we should not underestimate the role of direct 
investment flows within the Baltic region (see the chart). 
Many companies — especially at the early stages of internationalization of 
their business — tend to invest in the neighbouring countries, which they know 
well and where they do not have to overcome any significant language, cultural, 
legal or other non-economic barriers. The ideas about an important role of psy-
chological distance in direct investment and gradual acquisition of skills in exter-
nal economic activities, which are rather complicated in nature, formed a basis for 
the Uppsala model of internationalization in the 1970s [7; 8]. Based on the experi-
ence of Swedish companies, this model demonstrates that novice investors can 
successfully compete with the leading TNCs in large western European countries 
and the USA by finding their niches. 
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Current processes of globalization and informatization raise some doubts 
on the traditional assumption that training in skills necessary for conducting 
business outside the neighbouring countries requires a long period of time. 
At the same time, the role of neighbourhood is still important for rather 
small companies that do not have sufficient resources for collecting detailed 
data on specific features of business environment round the world or at-
tracting top managers experienced in global activities. This idea is illustrated 
by trans-border investments of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian companies, 
which are locked up in the Baltic region to a certain extent. Also, geographi-
cal distance remains important for large-scale companies in some industries 
with specific technological characteristics. For instance, Vattenfall — a 
Swedish electricity provider, which is included in the top 50 non-financial 
TNCs by external assets — concentrates its investment expansion on the 
neighbouring EU countries. This company is the third largest energy pro-
ducer in Germany, with power stations in Poland, Finland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Great Britain. 
Nevertheless, the role of neighbourhood should not be overemphasized. 
For example, the Swedish government’s indecisive position on further regu-
lation of relations with the EU up to the autumn of 1990 gave Swedish TNCs 
a cause for concern over their alleged discrimination in the key market. As a 
result, in the late 1980s — early 1990s, Sweden witnessed an unprecedented 
expansion of production capacities of supranational companies in the terri-
tory of the European Communities members, which were preparing for the 
creation of full-fledged European Union [2]. At present, northern European 
companies as well as other TNCs face the key challenges of globalization, 
including increasing competition with manufacturers from the new industrial 
countries and China. This stimulates these companies to move some of their 
enterprises to the countries with cheap labour force — not only outside the 
Baltic region, but outside Europe as well [1]. 
Nevertheless, for many companies of the Baltic region these trend lead 
to gradual transformation of several neighbouring sale markets into one 
common home market. Apparently, this process mostly affected Swedish 
and Finnish companies. The pre-accession work in Finland created favour-
able investment conditions for other countries [12, p. 5—6]. Up to the pre-
sent days, more than half all direct foreign investment in Finland is of Swed-
ish origin. The special role of Swedish investment is also typical for Den-
mark, though, to a lesser degree. Some companies, e. g. Nordea Bank or Te-
liaSonera, a telecommunication giant, being Swedish on a pro forma basis, 
are partly controlled by other Scandinavian and Finnish capital. 
In the late 1990s many Swedish and Finnish investors embarked on ac-
tive and, quite often, joint market expansion in the Baltic States. They can 
also place their investment in Poland, Russia (mostly in north-western parts) 
and other countries. However, they usually see Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
as their expanded home markets. In some cases northern European investors 
carry out individual expansion campaigns in each of the three countries (like 
TeliaSonera or Tele 2, which implement either their own projects or joint 
projects with local mobile service providers). Another way of entering the 
Ä.   V. Kuznetsov 
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regional market is an acquisition of a local TNC. A perfect example is an ac-
quisition of Estonia’s Hansabank by Sweden’s Swedbank. Sometimes the 
control is set over the regional TNCs and third investors, as it happened with 
Tamro, a large company selling pharmaceuticals. This Finnish company with 
affiliates in Sweden, the Baltic States and Poland was bought by Germany’s 
Phoenix Group. 
However, there is a fundamental distinction between the three Baltic 
States and northern European countries — the role of direct industrial in-
vestments is much less important in the first group of countries. The current 
world economic crisis has demonstrated how dangerous it is to bet on the 
service industry internationalization alongside actual deindustrialization of 
economy. A boom in foreign investment in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
was partly caused by formal improvement of an investment image of the 
three states after their accession to the EU in 2004, but it did not last for a 
long time. The situation was worsened later on by a growth of production 
costs in the Baltic States, which disrupted their competitiveness, although to 
a large extent it was caused by joining the common market [4]. 
 
Expansion of German and Polish TNCs in the Baltic region 
 
Germany’s companies began to demonstrate their interest in investing to 
northern European countries a long time ago. Along with their selling units 
created in the 1950s-1960s, West German manufacturing ventures had ap-
peared in Denmark before it joined the EU. A counter flow of investment 
started to grow up. In the beginning, northern European investors concen-
trated their activity in the north of West Germany — mainly in Hamburg. 
However, Danish companies invested a lot in the cross-border regions in-
cluding such well-known companies as Lego, a toy manufacturer, and two 
machine-building companies, Grundfos and Danfoss. By the 1980s, accom-
panied by a rise in investment share in the service industry, the expansion of 
Danish, Swedish and Finnish TNCs had affected many other lands in West 
Germany. The leading receiver of direct Finnish investment was Frankfurt 
am Main, for example [11]. 
The EU enlargement to the north in 1995 gave an incentive for German 
investors to increase their investment in Sweden and Finland due to intensi-
fication of medium-sized German companies’ expansion [3, p. 68]. In addi-
tion, German TNCs continued to acquire, on a rather regular basis, large 
companies in the Baltic region, mainly in Scandinavia. Thus, Volkswagen 
paid 4.4 billion dollars for 17 % shares of Swedish Scania in 2008. A year 
later, Colexon Energy, a second-tier company, bought Renewagy, a Danish 
alternative energy producer, for 1.3 billion dollars [9, p. 13]. Northern Euro-
pean investors also made large investments in Germany; for example, Swe-
den’s Vattenfall stands out with its “from scratch” projects, which are not 
very typical of the industrial sector in the advanced EU countries. 
Nevertheless, despite the long history and a large volume of counter 
flows of direct investment between Germany and the Baltic region countries, 
the role of the latter for German TNCs is rather small, compared to even the 
new EU members from central and Eastern Europe. Thus, Sweden is behind 
Austria, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (leaving alone the Benelux 
 Cross-border cooperation 
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countries) according to the scale of accumulated direct German investment 
[9, p. 10]. Germany, which belongs to the Baltic region only partially, does 
not depend on northern European direct investment to a large extent (see the 
chart). 
Poland, being Germany’s neighbour, cannot be considered the “pillar” of 
German capital either. Thanks to its rather concise sale market, fast EU inte-
gration and close economic links with other eastern European countries (out-
side the EU as well), Poland has become a base for regional expansion for 
many TNCs (not only western European ones). There are only 3 large-scale 
non-financial companies in Poland that belong to Germany among the 20 
largest ones; although Metro, a trading company, ranks the first on the list 
and Volkswagen ranks the fourth (only one northern European TNC entered 
the list — the above-mentioned Vattenfall) [14, p. 12]. 
Growing current foreign expansion of Polish investing companies is 
concentrated in central and eastern European countries, and countries outside 
the EU rather than in the Baltic region. Poland’s neighbour — Lithuania — 
is an exception due to both numerous small-scale projects and a major acqui-
sition of a Polish TNC abroad — a big oil refinery, Mazeiku Nafta. PKN Orlen 
bought 84.4 % of its shares for 2.5 billion dollars in 2006 [15, p. 2—5]. 
 
Limited participation of Russian companies in corporate integration 
 
Russian companies occupy a specific position in corporate integration in 
the Baltic region. On the one hand, the volume of Russian direct investment in 
the Baltic region countries is rather large, particularly in the Baltic States. On 
the other hand, Russian investment is mainly limited to energy and transit pro-
jects. The main investor in the region is Gazprom. In the Baltic States and in 
Finland the assets of Russian business (starting from key businesses, such as 
Global-Trans and Global-Ports emerged on the basis of N-Trans, up to giant 
industrial companies such as Severstal, LUKOIL and Acron) serve foreign 
trade. 
There are successful projects in other sectors, too. For example, Finland’s 
nickel refinery, Harjavalta, acquired by Norilsk Niskel; Kubikenborg, an alumin-
ium plant in Sweden, acquired by RUSAL, a joint company; a lube refinery in 
Finland and a network of filling stations in the Baltic region countries owned by 
by LUKOIL; a steel rolling works, DanSteel, owned by Novolipetsk iron and steel 
works; a lumbering machine-building plant in Denmark, Silvatec, owned by Trac-
tor Plants group corporation [10]. At the same time the attempts of Russian busi-
ness to get into the car industry are still ineffective. There is almost no direct in-
vestment in service industries, including telecommunication where Russian com-
panies in other regions are rather successful. 
The expansion of Russia’s investment in the Baltic region faces a number of 
challenges: weak competitiveness of some Russian companies, which becomes 
obvious when compared to northern European TNCs that have built their business 
in the market successfully (in banking and insurance business in particular); some 
non-economic obstacles, e. g., political issues in the Baltic states (lack of agree-
ment on mutual support and stimulation of investment between Russia, Estonia 
and Latvia); adverse stereotypes of Russian businessmen in the region [5, p. 77—
78]. 
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Russian investment contacts with the Baltic region countries are gradu-
ally developing. The volume of investment made by Swedish, Finnish and 
other TNCs in Russia is growing (including investors from the Baltic States, 
which are not very active). Most of them are particularly interested in coop-
eration with north-west Russia. However, the actual integration of Russian 
business into the Baltic part of the European integration space is still rather 
weak, especially when considering trans-border production and marketing 
chains, in which Russian companies take part. Compared to the extent of 
corporate integration of northern European countries, Russia’s participation 
is mainly limited to counter but non-crossing flows of direct investment. 
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